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vRÉSUMÉ
Les mécanismes de contrôle d’accès basés sur les rôles accordés et les privilèges prédéfinis
limitent l’accès des utilisateurs aux ressources sensibles à la sécurité dans un système logi-
ciel multi-utilisateurs. Des modifications non intentionnelles des privilèges protégés peuvent
survenir lors de l’évolution d’un système, ce qui peut entraîner des vulnérabilités de sécurité
et par la suite menacer les données confidentielles des utilisateurs et causer d’autres graves
problèmes. Dans ce mémoire, nous avons utilisé la technique “Pattern Traversal Flow Anal-
ysis” pour identifier les différences de protection introduite dans les systèmes WordPress et
MediaWiki. Nous avons analysé l’évolution des privilèges protégés dans 211 et 193 versions
respectivement de WordPress et Mediawiki, et nous avons constaté qu’environ 60% des com-
mits affectent les privilèges protégés dans les deux projets étudiés. Nous nous référons au
commits causant un changement protégé comme commits (PIC). Pour aider les développeurs
à identifier les commits PIC en temps réel, c’est à dire dès leur soumission dans le repertoire
de code, nous extrayons une série de métriques à partir des logs de commits et du code
source, ensuite, nous construisons des modèles statistiques. L’évaluation de ces modèles a
révélé qu’ils pouvaient atteindre une précision allant jusqu’à 73,8 % et un rappel de 98,8 %
dans WordPress, et pour MediaWiki, une précision de 77,2 % et un rappel allant jusqu’à
97,8 %. Parmi les métriques examinés, changement de lignes de code, correction de bogues,
expérience des auteurs, et complexité du code entre deux versions sont les facteurs prédictifs
les plus importants de ces modèles. Nous avons effectué une analyse qualitative des faux
positifs et des faux négatifs et avons observé que le détecteur des commits PIC doit ignorer
les commits de documentation uniquement et les modifications de code non accompagnées
de commentaires.
Les entreprises de développement logiciel peuvent utiliser notre approche et les modèles pro-
posés dans ce mémoire, pour identifier les modifications non intentionnelles des privilèges
protégés dès leur apparition, afin d’empêcher l’introduction de vulnérabilités dans leurs sys-
tèmes.
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ABSTRACT
Access control mechanisms based on roles and privileges restrict the access of users to security
sensitive resources in a multi-user software system. Unintentional privilege protection changes
may occur during the evolution of a system, which may introduce security vulnerabilities,
threatening user’s confidential data, and causing other severe problems. In this thesis, we use
the Pattern Traversal Flow Analysis technique to identify definite protection differences in
WordPress and MediaWiki systems. We analyse the evolution of privilege protections across
211 and 193 releases from respectively WordPress and Mediawiki, and observe that around
60% of commits affect privileges protections in both projects. We refer to these commits as
protection-impacting change (PIC) commits. To help developers identify PIC commits just-
in-time, i.e., as soon as they are introduced in the code base, we extract a series of metrics
from commit logs and source code, and build statistical models. The evaluation of these
models revealed that they can achieve a precision up to 73.8% and a recall up to 98.8% in
WordPress and for MediaWiki, a precision up to 77.2% and recall up to 97.8%. Among the
metrics examined, commit churn, bug fixing, author experiences and code complexity between
two releases are the most important predictors in the models. We performed a qualitative
analysis of false positives and false negatives and observe that PIC commits detectors should
ignore documentation-only commits and process code changes without the comments.
Software organizations can use our proposed approach and models, to identify unintentional
privilege protection changes as soon as they are introduced, in order to prevent the introduc-
tion of vulnerabilities in their systems.
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
RÉSUMÉ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
LIST OF APPENDIXES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Research Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Thesis Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1 Pattern Traversal Flow Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Definite Protection Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 Protection-Impacting Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.4 Reporting Protection-Impacting Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4.1 Choice of pair releases and changes identification . . . . . . . . . . . 9
CHAPTER 3 CRITICAL LITERATURE REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1 Protection Impacting Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2 Just-in-time Prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3 Vulnerabilities in Web Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.1 Case Study Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.1.1 Collecting Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
viii
4.1.2 Identifying Protection-Impacting Commits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.1.3 Computing Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
CHAPTER 5 CASE STUDY RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
CHAPTER 6 THREATS TO VALIDITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6.1 Threats to internal validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6.2 Threats to conclusion validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6.3 Threats to external validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.1 Summary of the Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .     40
ix
LIST OF TABLES
Table 4.1 Commit Log Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Table 4.2 Code Complexity Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Table 5.1 Median value of the characteristics of PICs and non-PICs as well as
p-value of Mann-Whitney U test and effect size for WordPress project 25
Table 5.2 Median value of the characteristics of PICs and non-PICs as well as
p-value of Mann-Whitney U test and effect size for MediaWiki project 26
Table 5.3 Accuracy, precision, recall and F-measure obtained from GLM, Naive
Bayes, C5.0, and Random Forest when predicting protection-impacting
changes in WordPress repository . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Table 5.4 Qualitative Observations Over Wrongly Classified Commits . . . . . . 30
xLIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1 RBAC : Role Based Access Control (Idenhaus, 2017) . . . . . . . . . 2
Figure 1.2 Just In Time prediction processing of Pushing Commits . . . . . . . . 3
Figure 1.3 Overview of our Research Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Figure 4.1 Processing Steps for Detecting Protection-Impacting Lines of Code Us-
ing PTFA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Figure 5.1 Proportion of Protection-Impacting changes commits in WordPress and
MediaWiki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
xi
LIST OF APPENDIXES
Figure A.1 Distribution of different metrics specifying the characteristics of PICs
and non-PICs commits in WordPress. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Figure A.2 Distribution of different metrics specifying the characteristics of PICs
and non-PICs commits in MediaWiki. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
xii
LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS
LOC Lines of Code
SCM Source Code Management
OSS Open Source Software
MSR Mining Software Repositories
RBAC Role-Based Access Control
CFG Control Flow Graph
DPD Definite Protection Difference
PIC Protection-Impacting Change
PTFA Pattern-Traversal Flow Analysis
PSP Property Satisfaction Profiles
SQA Software Quality Assurance
1CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
Web applications became a necessary component of internet development that carry daily
services to millions of users to obtain information, perform financial transactions, provide
them a fabulous time to socialize and communicate. Furthermore, many companies have
transferred a huge portion of their services and applications on the web. Consequently, people
from different places can share their information progressively and make a collaboration
through web applications (Cho et Kim, 2004). On the other hand, web applications are one
of the popular targets for attackers. Therefore, vulnerabilities that make an attacker able to
control a web application and have access to its data pose a significant threat (Wassermann
et Su, 2007). In this thesis, we focus on access control vulnerabilities in which we used
machine learning techniques to predict just-in-time suspected commits that represent the
vulnerability of the system. Access control, also known as authorization, is a key security
mechanism in software applications, which mediates all accesses and resources according to
a predefined policy.
However, in the role-based access control (RBAC) (Sandhu et al., 1996), specific roles and
privileges are assigned to the users of the applications and checks to ensure that all access
conforms to the application’s policy. It is a methodical framework for provisioning a group
of roles and privileges. Allocation of the roles facilitates the access of different categories of
users such as employees, contractors, and external users by incorporating policies and rules
necessary to give the proper access to each of them (Rouse, 2018).
Figure 1.1 presents the functionality mechanism of the RBAC system. Users have to be
granted access, to be able to get the assets. The ability to get the asset is passing through
the rules which are controlling access. The rule is the permission to have access to the
asset. It includes roles. The assignment of the roles can have user association in different
ways. Then, the attributes determine the different association with users and rules are used
to figure roles associations. Moreover, a user can be declared to have a specific associated
role. Finally, all users should be associated with their attributes. In the RBAC model, what
makes the controlling and maintaining access easier is the non requirement to maintain a
direct relationship for each user with a specific role. The roles are acting as an abstraction
layer containing a group of robust rules protecting the assets or different protected resources
(Sander, 2009; Idenhaus, 2017).
Although implementing RBAC methodology appears simple, in practice it is difficult to en-
force it efficiently. Based on the RBAC model, each role is associated with the authorizations
2Figure 1.1 RBAC : Role Based Access Control (Idenhaus, 2017)
linked to the different responsibilities. To manage these roles, companies that handle sev-
eral applications have to make continuous maintenance and even to manage hundreds or
thousands of roles across applications. In such case, companies that use RBAC’s role-based
models are confronted with role explosion, which increases the risk of developers accidentally
breaking access control rules when modifying the code (Harel, 2017).
Pinto et Stuttard (2011) studied a large number of applications between 2007 and 2011 and
reported that almost 71% of all web applications suffer from broken access controls. An
example of broken access control is a Fintech application which investigates whether a user
is allowed to transfer money from a PayPal account, without validating that this PayPal
account belongs to the user.
Most of the recently announced cases of cyber-attacks and data violation have all been
attributed to errors, bugs and different forms of weakness recognized in the software devel-
opment process. Several billions of dollars lost resulted from these errors (Li et al., 2017a;
Telang et Wattal, 2005). Even more, most of the exploitable vulnerabilities that hackers use
to attack Web sites or corporate servers are usually results of programming errors Vijayan
(2009). Piancó et al. (2016) found that the frequency of changes can reveal functions more
prone to have vulnerabilities, which opens doors for us to discuss if the level of protection
changes which represents a vulnerability to the system.
During the evolution of an application, developers often modify the code enforcing access
control to add more functions and resources. However, unexpected changes to the roles and
privileges may cause security vulnerabilities in the application.
3The consequences of unintentional protection changes can also be destructive. An attacker
can use the vulnerabilities on the privilege protections to view, change or delete sensitive
content; execute unauthorized functions; or even take control of the administration of the
application. Therefore, it is very important to analyze the code changes carefully, which
affect the privilege protections in an application (Laverdière et Merlo, 2017).
In this thesis, we propose a just-in-time analysis of protection-impacting change (PIC) com-
mits, which are commits that affect privilege protections in an application. We build a
statistical model to classify the commits submitted to the source code repository. A just-
in-time detection of PICs is very desirable for many reasons. First and foremost, it allows
corrections in an earlier stage of the software development process, when the cost of cor-
rection is low. Second, it facilitates the identification of the root cause of the issue. In
comparison, the accumulation of many weeks or months of code changes may result in com-
plicated protection-impacting changes. This would make identification of the root cause and
corrections much harder. And finally, an analysis based on statistical models is expected to
be faster.
In Figure 1.2, we present our proposed just-in-time prediction model. Before pushing a
commit into the repository, the developer could run the proposed model to have an idea
about the risk of breaking a protection If the risk is higher than a certain threshold (decided
by the development team), the developer has to do refactoring on the changes and submit it
for a thorough review.
Figure 1.2 Just In Time prediction processing of Pushing Commits
Previous studies on definite protection differences used an automated Pattern-Traversal Flow
Analysis (PTFA) which is a static analysis and operated at a release granularity (Laverdière
et Merlo, 2017; Laverdière et Merlo, 2017b; Laverdière et Merlo, 2018). These analyses
4required about 10 and 17 minutes on average per release pair for WordPress and MediaWiki,
respectively.
1.1 Research Objectives
In this thesis, we use a dataset of protection-impacting changes computed using Pattern
Traversal Flow Analysis (Gauthier et Merlo, 2012) in 211 release pairs of WordPress and 193
release pairs of MediaWiki. We build machine learning models on commits that touched on
protection impacting changes and that affected the attribution of privileges in the code, then
we perform a qualitative analysis to determine the characteristics of misclassified commits.
Figure 1.3 presents an overview of our methodology. First, we gather releases from both
studied projects including WordPress and MediaWiki. Then, we compose releases of each
project into pairs to study the protection impacting changes (PIC) that occurred between
each pairs. We used the tool presented in (Laverdière et Merlo, 2018) which reports the lines
that have the PIC. Those lines are considered as the oracle of protection impacting changes
lines. Finally, using a Python script, we were able to find the responsible commit that
introduced the PIC lines. We compute commit log metrics and then used the Understand
software analysis tool (scitool, 2017) to compute complexity of the code metrics. Moreover,
we used computed metrics as input for the machine learning algorithms, to create predictive
models capable of detecting suspicious commit, that could cause vulnerabilities issues. Then,
we analyze the effectiveness of our models by conducting a qualitative analysis studying the
misclassified (false negative and true negative) commits. Finally, using the obtained results,
we answer the following research questions:
Figure 1.3 Overview of our Research Approach
RQ1: What is the proportion of protection-impacting changes in Wordpress and MediaWiki?
We analyzed protection-impacting changes in two repositories including WordPress and Me-
5diaWiki. We used the Role Based Access Control (RBAC) (Sandhu et al., 1996) approach
to determine PIC lines in the different releases. We found that privilege protections were
impacted by changes in 58% (123 / 211) of WordPress studied releases pairs and 77% (149
/ 193) of MediaWiki studied releases pairs. We performed an empirical study to identify
PIC commits occurrences from the source code repositories of the studied systems. We
found that PIC commits account for 62% and 59% of commits in WordPress and MediaWiki,
respectively.
RQ2: What are the characteristics of protection-impacting changes?
By examining the characteristics of PIC commits and other commits (i.e., commits that did
not affect privilege protections), we observed that, PIC commits are submitted by developers
with higher experience, in general. Besides, developers are likely to change fewer files, there
are less inserted and deleted lines in PIC commits. They tend to implement more complex
source code in PIC commits with the high number of functions, the number of declarative
statements, high nested level of control functions, the more cyclomatic complexity of nested
functions and more comment ratio. The risk of faults is higher in PIC commits.
RQ3: To which extent can we predict protection-impacting changes?
We used GLM, Naive Bayes, C5.0, and Random Forest algorithms to predict whether a
commit is a PIC. Our predictive models reach the precision of 73.8% and recall up to 87.6%
in WordPress. In MediaWiki, we obtained the precision of 77.2% and recall of 96%. Software
organizations can apply our proposed techniques to identify PIC early on (i.e., as soon as
they are introduced in the code repository) before they are exploited by malicious users.
RQ4: Why do automatic machine learning models misclassify some protection-impacting
changes?
After a qualitative analysis, we observed that false positive and false negative PICs are due to
the commits related to documentation or those that changed a version field (for WordPress, in
version.php and in DefaultSettings.php for MediaWiki). Some other wrongly classified
commits featured changes in the embedded HTML, JavaScript or CSS code.
1.2 Thesis Plan
The thesis is organized as follows. In chapter2, we present the background information about
Pattern Traversal Flow Analysis and the detection of protection-impacting changes. Chapter3
discusses the related works. Chapter4 explains the design of our case study. Then, we answer
the defined research questions and present the results in chapter5. Chapter6 discusses the
threats to validity of our study. And finally, we conclude our thesis in chapter7.
6CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND
In this chapter, we provide background information about Pattern Traversal Flow Analysis
and explain how we detect definite protection differences in this thesis.
2.1 Pattern Traversal Flow Analysis
Pattern Traversal Flow Analysis (PTFA) (Gauthier et Merlo, 2012; Francois et Ettore, 2012;
Letarte et Merlo, 2009) is an automated whole-program static analysis. This model-checking
approach verifies Boolean properties. Thus, PTFA verifies the property satisfaction that a
predicate is true on all paths reaching a statement s. In our case, we use PTFA for code
patterns pertaining to privilege verification for privilege priv ∈ Privileges. PTFA verifies
the property satisfaction over the application’s Control Flow Graph (CFG) CFG = (V,E),
where V is the set of vertices and E is the set of edges.
A PTFA engine creates model checking automata from the CFG and computes the graph
reachability from the starting node v0. PTFA automata are predicate-context-sensitive,
meaning that security contexts are distinguished in the interprocedural analysis, and that
equivalent contexts are merged. PTFA models have up to four states for each CFG vertex and
privilege. These states encode the property satisfaction of the local and calling contexts and
may be understood as being either protected or unprotected states, with regards to privilege
priv. The PTFA model construction algorithm builds a model with many unreachable states
and transitions. To facilitate reasoning, we simplify the models by retaining only reachable
states and transitions. This model is called the reachable PTFA model.
2.2 Definite Protection Differences
When a privilege priv is verified on all paths leading to CFG vertex v, we consider that v
is definitely protected for priv. We can determine definite protection using the existence of
states in reachable PTFA models. If v is definitely protected for privilege priv, then at least
one protected state for vi and no unprotected state for vi exists in the model for priv. If an
unprotected state is reachable in the automaton for priv, then priv is not verified in at least
one path to vi.
Definite Protection Differences. When comparing two versions of an application (Vera and
Verb), Definite Protection Differences (DPD) may occur for code that is shared by the two
versions (Laverdière et Merlo, 2017b). When a statement s is common to releases Vera and
7Verb, a DPD occurs when the definite privilege protection for s differs between Vera and
Verb.
Statement s is loss-affected when s is definitely protected by privilege priv in Vera, but is
no longer so in Verb – meaning that there exists at least one unprotected path to s in Verb.
Conversely, s is gain-affected when s is not definitely protected by privilege priv in Vera, but
is so in Verb. We use the term security-affected to refer to vertices that are either gain-affected
or loss-affected.
2.3 Protection-Impacting Changes
Protection-Impacting Changes (PIC) Laverdière et Merlo (2018) are determined using code
changes and graph reachability in reachable PTFA models.
deletedState(qi,j,k) .= i /∈ dom(vertexMap) ∨ qvertexMap(i),j,k /∈ Qb (2.1)
addedState(qi,j,k) .= i /∈ image(vertexMap) ∨ qbMap(i),j,k /∈ Qa (2.2)
deletedEdges
.=( qi1,j1,k1 , qi2,j2,k2) ∈ Ta
∣∣∣∣∣∣ deletedState(qi1,j1,k1) ∨ deletedState(qi2,j2,k2) ∨( qvertexMap(i1),j1,k1 , qvertexMap(i2),j2,k2 ) /∈ Tb
 (2.3)
addedEdges
.=( qi1,j1,k1 , qi2,j2,k2 ) ∈ Tb
∣∣∣∣∣∣ addedState(qi1,j1,k1) ∨ addedState(qi2,j2,k2) ∨( qbMap(i1),j1,k1 , qbMap(i2),j2,k2 ) /∈ Ta
 (2.4)
partialPIC(changes, i, k) .= changes ∩
(ReachableEdges(qi,0,k) ∪ReachableEdges(qi,1,k)) (2.5)
PIC(va, vb) .= partialPIC(deletedEdges, va, 1) ∪ partialPIC(deletedEdges, va, 0) ,
partialPIC(addedEdges, vb, 0) ∪ partialPIC(addedEdges, vb, 1)
 (2.6)
8Code changes are reflected in PTFA models as added and deleted edges. deletedEdges is
the set of deleted transitions in the reachable PTFA model for Vera. Similarly, addedEdges
is the set of added transitions in the reachable PTFA model for Ver b. Each set contains all
transitions which connect one or more deleted or added state. It also contains all transitions
for which no corresponding edge is present in the PTFA model of the other version. These
equations depend on the following symbols. Qi is the set of states in the reachable PTFA
model for version Ver i. Ti is the set of transitions in the PTFA model for version Ver i.
PTFA states are represented as qi,j,k, where i is the CFG vertex identifier, j is the property
satisfaction flag in the calling context, and k is the property satisfaction flag in the local
context. The predicate deletedState(qi,j,k) (Equation 2.1) is true whenever the state qi,j,k ∈
Vera has no corresponding state in Ver b. Likewise, the predicate addedState (Equation 2.2) is
true whenever the state qi,j,k ∈ Ver b has no corresponding state in Vera. This correspondence
depends on the injective function vertexMap, which associates vertices in Vera to their
corresponding vertices in Verb. The function bMap is its reverse function. The symbols
dom and image correspond to the function’s domain and image, respectively. In addition,
protection-impacting changes belong to paths between the start of the program and security-
affected vertices, on appropriately protected paths. For loss-affected code, the protection-
impacting changes are the deletedEdges 2.3 belonging to positively-protected paths to va and
the addedEdges 2.4 belonging to negatively-protected paths to vb. For gain-affected code,
the protection-impacting changes are similar, but with the protectedness reversed. For the
sake of simplicity, and due to space constraints, we combine the definitions of protection-
impacting changes for all security-affected code into the definition of PIC (Equation 2.6).
In Equation , ReachachableEdges(qi,j,k) is a function returning all edges between the initial
state and the state qi,j,k in the reachable PTFA model. The partialPIC function 2.5 combines
changed edges (i.e. addedEdges or deletedEdges) with reachable edges for either Vera or
Verb. Finally in Equation 2.6, the vertices va and vb respectively belong to the CFG of Vera
and Verb and correspond to each other (i.e. vb = vertexMap(va)).
2.4 Reporting Protection-Impacting Lines
Because it would be non-trivial to mine a software system in relation to edges in a control
flow graph, we project our results over source code lines. This projection would also be easier
to understand by end-users.
The results of a naive projection are likely to be problematic for end-users. Edges in
addedEdges and deletedEdges may connect states belonging to unchanged lines of code.
Users are likely to classify these as false positives, which would hurt psychological accept-
9ability. As such, we map PIC edges to source code locations, and retain only the locations
that belong to changed code. To simplify the equations, we treat all code changes as either
added or deleted code, similar to the git output. We define our line-projection functions in
Equation 2.7. Function PICl,a returns all protection-impacting code in Vera (i.e. deleted
code). And PICl,b does the same for version Verb(i.e.foraddedcode). The line-projection
functions rely on the projection functions pi1(x) and pi2(x), which respectively return the first
and second index of the ordered pair x.
PICl,a(va, vb) .=
 ⋃
(q1, q2)∈pi1(PIC(va,vb))
{srcLoc(q1), srcLoc(q2)}
 ∩ deleted
PICl,b(va, vb) .=
 ⋃
(q1, q2)∈pi2(PIC(va,vb))
{srcLoc(q1), srcLoc(q2)}
 ∩ added
(2.7)
2.4.1 Choice of pair releases and changes identification
Both of chosen projects are using a Software Configuration Management (SCM). One of
the key features of modern SCM is the support of parallel lines of development known as
branches. A branch is a virtual workspace forked from a particular state of the source code.
It provides isolation from other changes where a developer or team of developers can make
changes to the code in the branch without affecting others working outside the branch. There
are conventional models of SCM development chosen by developers to fix their strategy of
releases generation in a successive baseline (Walrad et Strom, 2002). Our strategy of choosing
pairs is to avoid comparing branches in parallel, that are wildly different in their point of
development interest. Using git repository graph, we compare new major and minor versions
with the nearest releases to the points of bifurcation where a fork branch was created. We
chose also series of releases in the same branch where developers test quality and fix bugs to
prepare for a production release (Walrad et Strom, 2002).
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CHAPTER 3 CRITICAL LITERATURE REVIEW
Our research project concerns two areas of software engineering research including min-
ing software repositories (MSR), in particular just-in-time prediction, and Secure Software
Engineering, specifically, protection impacting analysis and vulnerability analysis of web ap-
plications. This chapter provides a critical literature review of these topics.
3.1 Protection Impacting Analysis
There were few studies on privilege protection changes. They all used PTFA static analysis
and were conducted by comparing releases. Letarte et al. (2011) conducted a longitudinal
study of privilege protection over 31 phpBB releases. They extracted the intra-procedural
Control Flow Graph (CFG) in all functions of the system, then they used graph rewrite rules
to extract the several founded patterns of security models. The authors defined the security
patterns as Property Satisfaction Profiles (PSP) which represent a fulfillment estimation
of properties processed on the extracted models. Then, they examined the growth of the
changes made in the computed PSP on security models in the different releases of the chosen
Web application. The results show that the model evolution analysis permits to distinguish
changes in security levels between successive releases. The proposed approach requires almost
1 minute execution time for parsing, extraction of security models PSP for each version. This
application only used a binary distinction between the administrator and unprivileged users.
Laverdière et Merlo (2017a) defined definite protection differences (previously named privilege
protection changes) for richer protection schemes than Letarte et al. (Letarte et al., 2011).
They conducted longitudinal studies over 147 release pairs of WordPress on the presence of
privilege protection changes and their classification. The authors identified privilege protec-
tion changes from an inter-procedural control flow graph (CFG) when they differ between two
releases. Then, they examined the code and decided the security privilege protection models
of Web applications written in PHP utilizing Pattern Traversal Flow Analysis (PTFA). The
proposed methodology needs almost 7 minutes per release pair. The results show that 0.1%
of the privilege protection changes are related to the program size and 70.01% of privilege
protection changes represent possible security violations. Even more, 0.30% of the code is
affected by security changes.
Then in (Laverdière et Merlo, 2017), the authors used Pattern Traversal Flow Analysis
(PTFA) to statically examine code inferred formal models. They implemented the ana-
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lyzer and classifier in Java to handle PHP code using a JavaCC grammar. The objective was
to compute the counter-examples of definite protection properties and privilege protection
losses. The authors studied 147 release pairs of WordPress to compute privilege protec-
tions and changes occurred between releases. They computed counter-examples for a total of
14,116 privilege protection losses and they discovered spread in 31 release pairs. The analysis
requires 13 minutes to detect privilege protection losses between two releases.
Laverdière et Merlo (2018) defined protection impacting changes using PTFA. They con-
ducted a survey of 210 release pairs of WordPress. The obtained results show that only
41% of the release pairs present protection-impacting changes while the other releases do not
contain changes that touch privilege protection. Even more, protection impacting changes
represent more than the quarter of the total changed lines of code of the impacted release
pairs. Overall, they found that across the investigated releases of WordPress that the amount
of protection-impacting changes is with 10.89% of changed lines of code. The authors con-
clude that using protection-impacting changes, developers would only spend the time to
validate a median of the quarter of code changes in security-affected release pairs.
Previous studies operate their analysis at the release pairs analysis granularity and report
the PIC lines and take many minutes to complete. In our paper, we identified responsible
commits that induced PIC lines and built predictive models for protection-impacting changes
that operate at the commit granularity.
Protection impacting change analysis is conceptually similar to approaches that identify the
cause of bugs during evolution, such as Buginnings (Sinha et al., 2010). This tool identifies
bug-introducing code changes. It computes differences between dependence graphs and may
investigate multiple versions. The authors built a mechanism capable of identifying bug-
introducing code changes. They analyzed dynamically the effects of bug-fix code changes on
program dependencies. Considering the semantics of the code changes, they could identify
which version of the program the bug was first induced in the code. The proposed approach
is based on computing text differences by analyzing the impacts of changes on the data de-
pendencies, control dependencies, and all relations to compute added, deleted, and modified
statements between two versions in the system. Then navigating in reverse starting from the
second version backing in history to identify the version in which a statement was deleted or
touched in the source code. The study includes intra-procedural and inter-procedural depen-
dencies to identify the bug region. In the intra-procedural case, they constructed the program-
dependence graph for each changed procedure and they created a program-dependence graph
(PDG) for each procedure. The PDGs contain nodes that represent statements in the proce-
dure and edges that represent data and control dependencies surrounding the statements. In
the inter-procedural case, they constructed a system-dependence graph (SDG) that represent
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a set of PDGs that are connected at call sites via parameter and call edges. Each call site has
as input the variables that may be referenced or changed in the called procedure and give as
output the variables that may be modified by the called procedure. Finally, their approach is
conducted to find the chronologically last version where the bug region was created, it means
the last version that contains any dependence or statement in the bug region that did not
exist in previous version.
A major difference between these tools and our work is that they rely on identifying bug ap-
pearance in version granularity, whereas our approach is based on commit granularity with
predictive analysis.
3.2 Just-in-time Prediction
Traditional defect prediction techniques often use metrics from bug reports to identify fault-
prone modules or severity of bugs. Such defect prediction techniques can help software
developers to prevent defects to some extent. However, those techniques do not help de-
velopers to handle defects once introduced in the system. In other words, before a defect
is definitely resolved, users have to deal with issues such as bad user experience, data loss,
and–or privacy threats. Just-in-Time defect prediction techniques are designed to predict
defects at the commit level; helping developers to locate and address defects right before
a commit is submitted for integration in a version control system. The use of just-in-time
systems is quite spread in the MSR literature. Kamei et al. (2013) used a variety of source
code metrics based on software change such as the number of added lines, and the developer
experience to predict defect prone commits. Their study was conducted on six open source
and five commercial systems to improve Software Quality Assurance (SQA). The effective-
ness of their models gives an average accuracy of 68 % and an average recall of 64 %. The
authors used the SZZ algorithm (Śliwerski et al., 2005) to combine information from the
version archived with the bug tracking system. Moreover, they showed that developers only
need 20 % of habitual effort to review changes when using their proposed model. However,
they only identified 35 % of all defect-inducing changes, contrary to our method that achieves
good recall (97-98%) and precision (72-73%).
Using just-in-Time defect prediction techniques, Fukushima et al. (2014) conducted an em-
pirical study on 11 open source projects to evaluate the performance of Just In Time (JIT)
cross-project models. The proposed technique helps developers avoid defects especially at
the beginning of the project where they do not have enough data to run traditional models
learned from the project history. They found that in most cases, JIT models in cross-project
context perform better than within-project models. Moreover, they confirm that projects
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with similar correlation values between predictors and the dependent metrics achieve better
results in a cross-project context.
Misirli et al. (2015) studied high impact fix-inducing changes (HIFCs) on six large open source
projects in order to determine the best indicators of fix-inducing changes. They proposed an
approach that measures the implementation work that developers spend some time to fix the
changes. They include a series of code and process factors at commit level such as the amount
of churn, the number of files and the number of subsystems touched by developers during
the fixing process of bug-inducing changes. The authors used the SZZ algorithm (Śliwerski
et al., 2005) to link the bug fix Id with the main changes which cause the bug. The proposed
models are able to predict between 56 % and 77 % of HIFCs, with 16% of misclassification.
They found that the added lines of code, the number of included authors that make a change,
and the number of files modified during a change are the best indicators of HIFCs.
An et Khomh (2015a) studied the appearance of crash-prone in Mozilla system. They identi-
fied commits responsible for the crash by using the SZZ algorithm (Śliwerski et al., 2005) to
map the bugs to their related commits. They found that the proportion of bug commits ac-
counted for 25.5% in the studied version control system. They also found that crash-inducing
commits are the most touched commits even more they were submitted by less experienced
developers. In addition, they found that crash-inducing commits fix a previous bug, and of-
ten, they lead to another bug. They studied also the changed type of crash-inducing commits
i.e.,class, comment, control flow, etc ... and they found that crash-inducing commits contain
more unique changed types. They created just-in-time predictive models using different algo-
rithm i.e.,GLM, Naive Bayes, C5.0, and Random Forest and they achieve a precision of 61.4%
and a recall of 95.0%. In their extension study (An et al., 2018) they characterise commits
that would lead to frequent crashes and they called it as highly impactful crash-inducing com-
mits. They observe that bugs caused by highly impactful crash-inducing commits were less
reopened by programmers and tend to be fixed by a single commit. After applying predictive
algorithms they could attend a precision of 60.9% and a recall of 91.1% to predict highly
impactful crash-inducing commits. They analyse the characteristics of misclassified commits,
and they found that 22.8% of commits do not lead to crashes but still caused bugs and they
observed that developers make a high proportion of renaming operations on the code of these
commits and they explain that renaming operations could lead to crash a software system.
This study is closely related to ours, they studied crash-inducing in the commit granularity.
Then, they created just-in-time predicting models. After that, they studied the causes of
misclassified commits. But, as far as we know, this is the first study that uses just-in-time
prediction techniques on the identification of protection-impacting changes.
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3.3 Vulnerabilities in Web Application
Vulnerability analysis is an important topic given the risk posed by software vulnerabilities
to users, e.g., sensitive information loss. Vulnerabilities are reported continuously in specific
databases such as Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) 1, National Vulnerability
Database (NVD) 2, Bugzilla 3, etc. These systems provide a reference for publicly known
security information vulnerabilities and exposures that was reported in software products.
Li et al. (2017b) analyses open source vulnerability databases and studied the characteristics
of the most occurred vulnerabilities in the software systems. Several studies focused on
predicting and contending against their appearance. The main causes for their appearance
are related to limited programming skills or lack of security mindfulness on the part of
developers (Jovanovic et al., 2006).
Scholte et al. (2012) performed an empirical analysis on a web security vulnerabilities re-
port from (CVE) to explore whether nowadays developers are aware of the seriousness of
web security issues evaluations. The study focused on SQL injection and cross-site scripting
vulnerabilities. They found that most of the vulnerabilities were not related to any mod-
ern attacks strategies. They explained that developers pay more attention to implement
correction against SQL injection and fail to take countermeasures against cross-site script-
ing vulnerabilities. The results show that the duration of validating foundational cross-site
scripting vulnerabilities are longer than those of SQL injection, which means that there still
exist the effects of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities that were submitted many years ago.
Popular applications are more exposed to the higher number of announced vulnerabilities
since popular applications are more targeted by attackers as it has more impact on potential
victims. Finally, they argue that web developers partly failed to protect their software, which
opens the doors for more research to investigate the causes of vulnerabilities appearance in
applications. In our study, we propose a tool model that could help developers to identify
their new modification that could threaten their system in a very specific type of vulnera-
bilities protection impacting changes (PICs). This study talked about the effort taken by
engineer to correct SQLI and cross-site scripting which is the same thing as PIC vulnerabil-
ities. To correct and found them it takes effort as well, but in our case, we build a model
that could find the vulnerably (PIC) and flag it before its injection on code source.
Shar et Tan (2012) conducted an empirical study to prevent SQL injection and XSS attacks
in the Web applications. This attack is a type of injection, in which a malicious scripts are
1https://www.cvedetails.com/
2https://nvd.nist.gov/
3https://www.bugzilla.org/
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injected in websites. The authors chose three open source PHP-based web applications, then
they identified and classified different natures of input sources of vulnerabilities using the
control flow graph (CFG). They used WEKA 4 to apply three different prediction algorithms
to assign each software sensitive sink to a class of the target attribute which represent a
binary assignation of vulnerable or not-vulnerable cases. As a result, their models predicted
over 85% of the studied attacks.
Gupta et al. (2015) proposed an approach to predict XSS vulnerabilities in web applications.
They studied an open source dataset from (Bertrand STIVALET, 2015) which includes two
categories of safe and unsafe vulnerabilities. The authors explored XSS vulnerabilities in
which malicious users inject code to steal sensitive information. They considered that user-
input information in the website is important to identify context-sensitive security vulnerabil-
ities, since an output statement refers to the user input via constant HTML string exchange
and generate dynamic response depending on the user input. To build predictive models,
they used the WEKA tool (Peter Reutemann Eibe Frank et Trigg, 2018). They achieved an
F-measure of 90.6 % and Accuracy of 92.6 %, using bagging classifier.
Spanos et al. (2017) assessed the severity level of vulnerabilities from the textual description
and examined the power of description to interpret the vulnerability severity. They considered
the description of the text as an independent variable and converted it into numerical data to
predict two kinds of independent metrics, including exploitable metrics, and impact metrics.
Exploitable metrics reflect the degree of easiness to exploit vulnerabilities, and impact metrics
reflect the effect of the successive exploitation of a vulnerability. Then, they employed mining
techniques, text analysis and classification methods e.g.,decision trees, neural networks and
used founded metrics to compute a score that determines the vulnerability severity. The
results show that using textual description, could enable identifying vulnerability severity
levels with high accuracy.
Chowdhury et Zulkernine (2011) used complexity, coupling, and cohesion metrics to pre-
dict vulnerabilities prone files in fifty-two releases of Mozilla Firefox. The authors extracted
the vulnerabilities that occurred in the studied systems from Mozilla Foundation Security
Advisories (MFSA). They used Bugzilla to track the responsible changes causing each re-
ported vulnerability. After that, they computed CCC metrics (Complexity, Coupling, and
Cohesion). Then, they applied different statistical techniques (C4.5 Decision Tree, Random
Forests, Logistic Regression, and Naïve-Bayes). The results report a detection rate of the
vulnerability-prone files equal to 75% . Shin et al. (2011) also used the code complexity,
code churn, and developer activity metrics to discriminate affected vulnerable files from the
4https://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/
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safe ones. They found that complex code programs are more likely to contain vulnerabilities.
Their model was able to predict 80% of vulnerable files.
There is a common point between previous studies and ours, both are predicting web security
vulnerabilities. They have used their methodology to analyse programs already created, then
they applied their models to looks for vulnerabilities i.e.,XSS, SQLI. However, their models
can only be applied after the vulnerability occurred and already affected a large population of
users, which differs with our analysis where we study the apparition of protection impacting
change and predicting them before their merge on the code source in the commit level (just-
in-time), In such case, correction of the vulnerability will be easierface to find and fix it, since
it still fresh in developer’s brain.
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CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN
In this chapter, we describe the methodology followed in this thesis.
4.1 Case Study Design
In the following diagram presented in Figure 4.1 shows the different steps we used to compute
PICs lines that we consider as an oracle of our analysis. First, We prepare all chosen versions,
then determine protection-impacting lines of code. Second, we compute the interprocedural
control flow graphs from the PHP source code of each version using a PHP front end. Then,
we compute the PTFA models and obtain definite privilege protections. Afterwards, we
compare the source code of the releases using GNU Diff. Using these code differences and
the aforementioned information, we obtain the definite protection differences and protection-
impacting changes. Please note that GNU Diff does not consider file renames. Instead, it
reports these as being fully deleted and fully added.
PHP Front End PTFA Analyzer
Code
Differencing
Source
Code
Code
Differences
DPD
Classifier
Classification
CFGs
Definite 
Protection
Version
Pairs
PTFA
Models
PIC Analyzer PICs
Figure 4.1 Processing Steps for Detecting Protection-Impacting Lines of Code Using PTFA
In this section, we describe the design of our case study which aims to answer the following
research questions:
• RQ1: What is the proportion of protection-impacting changes in Wordpress and Me-
diaWiki?
• RQ2: What are the characteristics of protection-impacting changes?
• RQ3: To which extent can we predict protection-impacting changes?
• RQ4: Why do automatic machine learning models misclassify some protection-impacting
changes?
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4.1.1 Collecting Data
Our study was performed on two open source projects: WordPress and MediaWiki. The
analysis encompassed 211 release pairs of WordPress, from 2.0 to 4.7.3 and 193 release pairs
of MediaWiki, from 1.5.0 to 1.29.2. We included all releases between the mentioned pairs.
The full list of the studied release pairs are available in our data repository 1.
WordPress is a popular web-based content management system mainly implemented in PHP.
It is a mature open source system with a long release history and its RBAC implementation
and configuration are relatively simple. In terms of physical lines of code (LOC), WordPress’s
PHP code ranges from roughly 35 KLOC in release 2.0 to 340 KLOC in release 4.7.3. For
the same releases, the combined HTML, JavaScript and CSS code amounted to roughly 13
KLOC and 179 KLOC, respectively.
MediaWiki is a content management system from the MediaWiki Foundation. It is well-
known thanks to its flagship user, Wikipedia. This application’s PHP code ranges from
roughly 149 KLOC to a peak of 1.35 MLOC. The combined HTML, JavaScript and CSS
code is roughly between 4.5 KLOC and 188 KLOC.
Please note that, in this work, we only take into account the code changes written in PHP.
WordPress and MediaWiki maintains multiple releases in parallel and patches vulnerabilities
for multiple versions simultaneously. As such, we organize release pairs in a tree according
to their semantic versioning (Preston-Werner, 2013) and release date information. Each edge
of that tree is a release pair. This approach was used in other RBAC evolution case studies
before (Laverdière et Merlo, 2017; Laverdière et Merlo, 2017b; Laverdière et Merlo, 2018).
In total, we found protection-impacting changes in 123 (58%) out of the 211 subject release
pairs of WordPress and 149 (77%) out of the 193 subject release pairs of MediaWiki.
Since users typically deploy official releases, we performed the static code analysis on these
releases only. We downloaded all subject releases from the official website of WordPress2.
Since we downloaded the release archives, we have analyzed them as-is. There were two
releases that were not published by WordPress on their site. In those cases, we extracted a
path from their SVN repository and applied it on the previous release.
To ease the analysis, we performed our data mining against git repositories of both systems.
For WordPress, we used a git-ified clone of the official WordPress SVN repository, hosted by
GitHub3. For MediaWiki, we used the official git repository 4.
1https://github.com/AmineBarrak/PIC_Analysis
2https://wordpress.org/download/release-archive/
3https://github.com/WordPress/WordPress
4https://gerrit.wikimedia.org/r/p/mediawiki/core.git
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Please note that there are discrepancies between the repository and the releases, as there are
additional files in the release (e.g. extensions). As such, we ignored protection-impacting
changes in these additional files.
4.1.2 Identifying Protection-Impacting Commits
Definite protection differences are due to code changes. These code changes are inserted
through commits in the version control system. Our oracle is derived from the PICs reported
by the PTFA-based tool. Protection-impacting lines of code can either be deleted or added
code.
We identify protection-impacting commits as follows. Our PIC detection tool provides a list
of protection-impacting lines of code for each release pair. These PICs are organized by file,
line, and the type of definite protection difference (loss or gain).
If the tool detects a series of protection-impacting changes between a pair of releases (VN
and VN ′), it will output the following information for each of them:
N N’ gain/loss F L
where F denotes the name of the file in which the privilege protection change occurred, while
L denotes the specific line of the change and B the bifurcation point between VN and VN ′ .
Between VN and VN ′ , there often exist multiple commits. To find out the corresponding
commit in which a privilege protection change occurred (either added or removed), we assume
that the most recent commit before VN ′ commit that modified line L in the file F is the commit
that introduced this privilege protection change. If the first commit in VN ′ is C ′, we apply
the following command to identify the commit(s) that contains privilege protection changes:
git blame -L B..C’ – F
Otherwise, we assume that a removed privilege protection line is based on the VN version,
we apply the following command to report commit that deleted a line:
git blame –reverse -L B..C’ – F
As our analysis dataset, we consider only commits responsible for the reported lines that
were modified in files between VN and VN ′ which include Protection Impacting commits.
4.1.3 Computing Metrics
To capture the characteristics of protection-impacting changes, we compute the 16 metrics
described in Table 4.2. We group the metrics in the two following categories:
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Commit log metrics
We extract the following commit-related metrics to capture the structure of committed code.
First, metrics related to date (i.e., week day, month day and month), because protection-
impacting changes may occur at specific dates (Castelluccio et al., 2017). Second, we compute
author experience to examine how commits or changes merged by less experienced developers
impact privilege protections. Third, metrics related to commits size (i.e., number of changed
files, number of added and deleted lines), because Walden et al. (2009) found that there is
usually a correlation between code change size and security issues. Fourth, we computed
message size metrics, as Alali et al. Alali et al. (2008) found that commit message size is an
indicator for maintenance activities.
We also identify commits related to bug fixing changes following the heuristic proposed by
Sliwerski et al. (Śliwerski et al., 2005). Using this information we compute the Boolean metric
Is bug fix for each commit.
Code complexity metrics
For each studied commit, we use the Mercurial log command to extract all of its changed
PHP files. Then, we apply the source code analysis tool Understand from Scitools 5 in
order to collect complexity metrics. Understand provides a command line tool that helps
to create a large number of project to analyse and to automate processing commits and
metrics generation. We create a bash script to automate the extraction. We obtain seven
code complexity metrics from Understand for the files in each subject commit, similar to
An and Khomh (An et Khomh, 2015b). These metrics are lines of code (LOC), Cyclomatic
complexity (also known as McCabe Cyclomatic complexity) which captures the occurrence
of decision points in the code, number of functions, maximum nesting which is the level of
controlling constructs in a function, number of declarative statements, number of blank lines,
and ratio of comment lines over all lines in a file. For each commit (containing multiple files),
we took the average of the metric values obtained for each file.
5, https://scitools.com/
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Table 4.1 Commit Log Metrics
Attribute Explanation and Rationale
Week day Day of week (from Mon to Sun). Code committed on certain week
days may be less carefully written (e.g., Friday) Śliwerski et al. (2005);
Anbalagan et Vouk (2009).
Month day Day in month (1-31). Code performed on certain days could be less
delicately written (i.e., end of months, before and during public hol-
idays).
Month Month of year (1-12). Code performed in some seasons may be less
delicately written (i.e., Christmas holidays, summer).
Message size Words in a commit message. In RQ2, we found that PIC commits
are correlated with longer commit messages.
Author experience The number of prior submitted commits. In RQ2, we found that
PIC commits tend to be submitted by less experienced developers.
Number of changed files
*
Number of changed files in a commit. In RQ2, we found that com-
mits with more changed files tend to have PIC apparition.
Number of added lines Number of inserted lines in a commit. In RQ2, we found that com-
mits with more added lines tend to have PIC apparition.
Number of deleted lines Number of deleted lines in a commit. InRQ2, we found that commits
with more deleted lines tend to have PIC apparition.
Is bug fix Whether a commit aimed to fix a bug. In RQ2, we found that PIC
commits are correlated with bug fixing code.
Table 4.2 Code Complexity Metrics
Attribute Explanation and Rationale
LOC Mean number of lines of code in all PHP files of a commit. In
RQ2, we found that PIC commits have higher code churn (i.e.,
added/deleted lines).
Number of functions Mean number of functions of all files in a commit. In RQ2 we found
that big functions may be difficult to understand or modify, and lead
to PIC.
Cyclomatic complexity Mean cyclomatic complexity of the functions in the all files of a com-
mit. In RQ2 we found Complex code is hard to maintain and may
cause crashes.
Max nesting Mean maximum level of nested functions in all files in a commit. In
RQ2 we found that highest nested functions correlate with PIC, even
a high level of nesting increases complexity.
Number of declarative
statements
Mean Number of declarative statements in a commit. In RQ2 we
found that highest declarative statements correlate with PIC
Number of blank lines * Mean number of blank PHP lines of all files in a commit. In RQ2 we
found that, the more blank lines, the highest it leads to PIC commits
Comment ratio Mean ratio of comment lines to code lines of all files in a commit.
Codes with lower ratio of comments may be hard to understand, and
may result in PIC
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CHAPTER 5 CASE STUDY RESULTS
In this chapter, we report and discuss answers to our research questions. For each research
question, we present the motivation, the approach followed to answer the question, and the
obtained results.
RQ1: What is the proportion of protection-impacting changes in Wordpress and
MediaWiki?
Motivation.
This question is preliminary to the remaining questions. It aims to examine the distribution
of PICs in Wordpress and MediaWiki. The result of this question will help web software man-
agers to realize the prevalence of PIC in projects. Allowing them to adjust their interventions
when modifying the code that introduced security protection-impacting changes.
Approach. To compute the proportion of protection-impacting changes in the studied
projects we conducted the PTFA analysis of PIC on releases pairs as described in Sec-
tion 4.1.2. We identified the modified PIC lines and then searched for the commit that
introduced the line. Finally, we computed the proportion of commits containing a PIC and
the proportion of commits that do not contain any PIC.
Findings. Among the modifications of php files that occurred over 211 and 193 pair releases
of WordPress and MediaWiki, we found 25069 commits in WordPress and 35864 commits
in MediaWiki. Through our analysis of protection-impacting change detection (described in
Section 4.1.2) we identified 62% (15700 / 25069) of PICs commits in WordPress and 59%
(21335 / 35864) of PICs commits in MediaWiki. Figure 5.1 illustrates the proportion of
protection-impacting changes commits and other commits.
Finding a PIC in a commit does not mean that all changed lines inside the commit represent
a protection impacting changes.



Protection impacting change commits account for 62% in WordPress and 59% on Medi-
aWiki, from the total number of studied releases.
Almost one out of every two commits is likely to contain PICs, which are at risk of introducing
vulnerabilities (Woodraska et al., 2011). Therefore, software developers should strive to catch
PIC commits as soon as possible, e.g., when they are submitted into the version control
system.
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Figure 5.1 Proportion of Protection-Impacting changes commits in WordPress and Medi-
aWiki
In the rest of this section, we will investigate the characteristics of commits that change
privileges (i.e., PIC) and examine how to effectively predict them early.
RQ2: What are the characteristics of protection-impacting changes?
Motivation. In RQ1, we found that almost one in two commits contain protection-
impacting changes. If developers fail to detect such changes and ensure the safety of the
commit before integration into the code base, users risk suffering from security vulnerabil-
ities. In this research question, we set out to investigate the characteristics of protection-
impacting changes. The answer to this research question can help software practitioners to
better differentiate protection-impacting changes from other changes.
Approach. We use the metrics shown in Tables 4.2 and statistically compare the 12 numer-
ical variables in the following order: message size, authors experience, number of changed
files, number of added lines, number of deleted lines, line of code, number of functions, cyclo-
matic complexity, maximum nesting, number of declarative statement, number of blank lines
and comment ratio. We do so while partitioning the commits between PICs and non-PICs.
If a commit contains more than one changed file, we compute the mean value of each metric
on these files. For each of the 12 metrics (mi), we formulate the following null hypothesis:
H0i : there is no difference between the values of mi for the commits that contain at least one
PIC and those that do not contain any, where i ∈ {1, . . . , 12}.
We use the Mann-Whitney U test (Hollander et al., 2013) to accept or reject the 12 null hy-
potheses. This is a non-parametric statistical test, which measures whether two independent
distributions have equally large values. We use a 95% confidence level (i.e., α = 0.05) to
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accept or reject these hypotheses. Since we perform more than one comparison on the same
dataset, to control the familywise error rate, we use the Bonferroni correction (Dmitrienko
et al., 2005). Concretely, we divide our α by the number of tests, i.e., α = 0.05/12 = 0.004.
Whenever we obtain a statistically significant difference between the metric values, we com-
pute the Cliff’s Delta effect size (Cliff, 1993), which measures the magnitude of the difference
while controlling for the confounding factor of sample size (Coe, 2002). We assess the mag-
nitude using the threshold provided in (Romano et D. Kromrey, 2006), i.e.,, |d| < 0.147
“negligible"(N), |d| < 0.33 “small"(S), |d| < 0.474 “medium"(M), otherwise “large"(L).
In addition to the 12 mentioned metrics, we investigate the distribution of the bug fixes
commits and the weekend churn (Saturday and Sunday) according to the partionning of PIC
and non-PIC dataset.
Findings.
Table 5.1 and 5.2 summarise differences between the characteristics of commits that in-
troduced protection-impacting changes (PIC) and others i.e., commits that did not alter
protection privileges (non-PIC), corresponding to the projects WordPress and MediaWiki.
We show the median value of PIC and non-PIC for each metric, as well as the p-value of the
Mann Whitney U test and the Cliff’s Delta effect size. We observe that the commit message
size of PICs is significantly longer than non-PICs commits messages sizes in both projects. It
is possible that PICs commits are more complex and consequently developers need extended
comments to describe these changes. According to the results of both projects, PICs are
submitted by developers with more experience. This result could be explained by the fact
that not all programmers have the ability to change sensitive code areas containing privi-
lege protection lines. Another interesting finding is the fact that PICs tend to have higher
code complexity in terms of number of functions, cyclomatic complexity, maximum nesting,
number of declarative statements and comment ratio. These results are reinforced by the
obtained medium and large effect sizes. Finally, most of our studied PICs commits are bug
fixing operations. Woodraska et al. (2011) found that bugs can turn into severe security
vulnerabilities which is consistent with our results.
In light of results from Table 5.1 we reject all the null hypotheses H0i . In other words, for all
metrics listed in Table 5.1, there exist statistically significant differences between PICs and
non-PICs commits in varying proportions. Appendix .1 and .2 represent more details about
the characteristics of protection impacting changes.
25
Table 5.1 Median value of the characteristics of PICs and non-PICs as well as p-value of
Mann-Whitney U test and effect size for WordPress project
Metric PIC non-PIC P-value Effect size
Message Size 19.66 15.61 <2.2e-16 0.144 (N)
Author experience 1531.98 1343.94 0.033 0.016 (N)
Number of changed files 3.18 2.60 <2.2e-16 0.127 (N)
Number of inserted lines 71.03 86.19 <2.2e-16 0.205 (S)
Number of removed lines 47.961 75.66 <2.2e-16 0.197 (S)
LOC 666.21 591.15 <2.2e-16 0.092 (N)
Number of functions 28.91 26.20 <2.2e-16 0.067 (N)
Cyclomatic complexity 9.93 7.97 <2.2e-16 0.054 (N)
Max nesting 3.65 3.46 <6.3e-15 0.057 (N)
Number of declarative
statements
42.13 37.73 <2.2e-16 0.069 (N)
Number of blank lines 160.13 139.25 <2.2e-16 0.105 (N)
Comment ratio 0.915 0.964 0.002 0.023 (N)
Is bug fix 58.7% 57.6% − −
Weekend churn 20% 21.7% − −




	
Overall, we found significant differences between PIC and the non-PIC commits on all
studied characteristics. PICs commits are submitted by experienced developers. They
contain longer commit messages and make complex changes in files.
RQ3: To which extent can we predict protection-impacting changes?
Motivation. On the one hand, leaving unintentional privilege protection changes in the
source code may lead to security vulnerabilities that severely affect end users. On the other
hand, identifying unintentional privilege protection changes from each new code change is a
non-trivial task. Although the PTFA-based analysis can scan a PHP system quickly (about
10 and 17 minutes on average per release pair, respectively for WordPress and MediaWiki),
it is still impractical to perform such analysis for each of the code changes because developers
may submit hundreds of code changes daily for a large-scale system. One feasible way to
remind developers a security warning in a real-time manner is to build just-in-time prediction
models. In our case, such models can be trained using historical data and predict whether a
new code change (such as a commit or a changed file) contains PIC(s) or not. Previous studies,
including (Kamei et al., 2013; Fukushima et al., 2014), showed that just-in-time prediction
models can help software practitioners better focus their efforts on debugging fault-inducing
changes, which can reduce code reviewing and testing efforts as well as prevent them from
delivering defects to end users. In this research question, we examine the possibility of
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Table 5.2 Median value of the characteristics of PICs and non-PICs as well as p-value of
Mann-Whitney U test and effect size for MediaWiki project
Metric PIC non-PIC P-value Effect size
Message Size 27.06 18.10 <2.2e-16 0.255 (S)
Author experience 1378.77 1012.47 <2.2e-16 0.093 (N)
Number of changed files 3.505 9.014 <2.2e-16 -0.055 (N)
Number of inserted lines 83.18 293.13 2.5*10e-4 -0.022 (N)
Number of removed lines 59.588 220.842 2.5*10e-3 -0.018 (N)
LOC 739.87 1399.06 <2.2e-16 -0.26 (S)
Number of functions 37.17 18.69 <2.2e-16 0.47 (M)
Cyclomatic complexity 2.47 2.23 <2.2e-16 0.056 (N)
Max nesting 3.31 1.66 <2.2e-16 0.48 (L)
Number of declarative
statements
57.37 27.80 <2.2e-16 0.48 (L)
Number of blank lines 130.49 166.63 <2.2e-16 -0.134 (S)
Comment ratio 0.528 0.503 <2.2e-16 0.284 (S)
Is bug fix 29.4% 23.4% − −
Weekend churn 18.5% 17.3% − −
using just-in-time prediction models to identify unintentional privilege protection changes in
real-time.
Approach. We use the metrics from Table 4.2 as independent variables to build statistical
models. All of these metrics are extracted at commit level as it is required for a just-in-time
prediction model. Our prediction target (i.e., dependent variable) is whether a new commit
contains at least one PIC or not. We apply four different machine learning algorithms:
General Linear Model (GLM), Naive Bayes, decision tree, and Random Forest.
General Linear Model is an extension of multiple linear regression and enables the analysis
of a binary classification problem, i.e., in our case, whether a commit contains PIC(s).
Although this algorithm is extensively used in classification analyses, it may not achieve a
good fitness when there is no smooth linear decision boundary in the dataset. In this work,
we use this algorithm as the baseline to assess the effectiveness of other models. Naive Bayes
are a set of logistic regression algorithms based on the Bayes’ theorem (Vapnik et Vapnik,
1998) with strong independence assumptions between the features. This algorithm often
obtains, in practice, a good classification result (Rish, 2001). Compared to General Linear
Model, decision tree does not assume a linear relationship between variables and it can also
implicitly perform variable screening or feature selection. Thus, decision tree is expected to
obtain a high prediction accuracy. Shihab et al. (2013) used the C4.5 decision tree algorithm
to predict re-opened bugs and got a good results. In this study, we used C5.0 model, the
improved version of C4.5, which can obtain a better accuracy, perform faster, and have less
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memory usage than C4.5 (Research, 2017). To further mitigate the biases and variance from
the decision tree model, Leo Breiman and Adele Cutler introduced Random Forest (Breiman,
2001), which takes a majority voting of decision trees to generate classification (predicting
often binary class labels) or regression (predicting numerical values) results. In previous just-
in-time prediction studies, e.g., (An et al., 2017), Random Forest achieved the best prediction
accuracy. In this study, we build 1,000 trees, each of which are with 5 randomly selected
metrics.
To reduce the multicollinearity from the dataset, we use the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
technique to remove correlated metrics before building the models. As recommended by
(Rogerson, 2010), we remove the metrics whose VIF values are greater than or equal to 5.
In Tables 4.2, the removed metrics are marked with *.
We apply ten-fold cross validation (Efron, 1983) to measure the fitness of the models using
R script https://github.com/swatlab/crash-inducing. The efficiency of the proposed
model is calculated based on general parameters as described in (Ding et Li, ????), We
reported respectively the general accuracy, as well as the precision, recall to report , and
F-measure on the commits or change files that contain PIC(s) for each model.
The simplest measure is the accuracy. It is defined as the ratio of the number of instances
which are correctly classified to the total number of the instances in test set. Its equation is
defined as follows,
Accuracy
.= (TN + TP )(TN + FP + FN + TP ) (5.1)
The measure, precision known as positive predictive value, is defined as the ratio of the
number of correctly classified positive instances to the total number of instances that are
classified into positive class. So the precision can be calculated by,
Precision
.= TP
TP + FP (5.2)
The measure, recall known as sensitivity, is defined as the ratio of the number of correctly
classified positive instances to the total number of positive instances. So, recall can be
calculated by,
Recall
.= TP(TP + FN) (5.3)
Based on precision and recall, we can get a comprehensive measure F-measure which is the
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measure of a test’s accuracy, which is defined as,
F −measure .= (2 ∗Recall ∗ Precision)(Recall + Precision) (5.4)
In the above definitions, True Positive (TP) is the number of positive cases classified correctly,
False Negative (FN) is the number of positive cases classified as negative, False Positive (FP)
is the number of negative cases classified as positive, and True Negative (TN) is the number
of negative cases classified correctly (Huang et al., 2012).
In the cross validation, we randomly split the subject commits into ten disjoint sets. Nine
of them are used as training data and the remaining one as testing data. We repeat this
process for ten times and report mean results for accuracy, precision, recall, and F-measure.
In the dataset, the commits containing PICs account for 62% and 59% corresponding to
WordPress and Wikimeda, which can lead to biases and inaccuracy in the results (Kamei
et al., 2007). To deal with this, we perform a combination of over- and under-sampling using
the R ovun.sample package. In the training sets, instances in the majority category (i.e.,
commit or changed file without PICs) will be randomly deleted and the minority category
(i.e., commit or changed file with PICs) will also be randomly boosted, until the number of
the instances in both categories achieve the same level. In addition to reporting the fitness of
the models, we will rank the impact of the independent variables to identify the top predictors
of the algorithm that obtains the best prediction results.
Findings. Table 5.3 shows the median accuracy, precision, recall, and F-measure for the
four algorithms used to predict whether a commit contains protection-impacting changes in
WordPress and MediaWiki systems. According to the results, our models can predict PIC
commits in WordPress system with a precision up to 73.8% and a recall up to 98.3%. In
MediaWiki we achieve a precision of 77.2% and a recall of 97.8%. Random Forest is the best
prediction algorithm. It achieves the best F-measure when predicting PICs commits.




Our predictive models can achieve a precision of 73.8%, and a recall of 87.6% in Word-
press. In MediaWiki, models achieve a precision of 77.2%, and a recall of 96%. The Ran-
dom Forest algorithm achieves the best prediction performance in both projects. Close-
ness is ranked as the best predictor in this algorithm. Software organizations can use the
proposed predictive models to catch protection impacting change commits just in time as
soon as they are submitted for integration in the repository, e.g., during code review.
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Table 5.3 Accuracy, precision, recall and F-measure obtained from GLM, Naive Bayes, C5.0,
and Random Forest when predicting protection-impacting changes in WordPress repository
Metric GLM Bayes C5.0 Random Forest
Fitting models using WordPress repository
Accuracy 64.2% 62.0% 68.8% 72.5%
PIC precision 64.8% 62.6% 71.0% 73.8%
PIC recall 94.1% 98.3 % 84.7% 87.6%
PIC F-measure 76.8% 76.4% 77.4% 79.8%
Fitting models using MediaWiki repository
Accuracy 74.3% 62.7% 78.6% 80.9%
PIC precision 73.7% 61.7% 71.0% 77.2%
PIC recall 88.3% 97.8 % 84.7% 96.0%
PIC F-measure 80.3% 76.4% 83.9% 85.6%
RQ4: Why do automatic machine learning models misclassify some protection-
impacting changes?
Motivation. In the previous research question, even though the models achieved a good
performance, there is still a percentage of the clean commits (respectively changed files) that
were classified by our models as commits (respectively changed files) with PICs, which we
refer to as false positives. In addition, certain commits (respectively changed files) with PICs
were wrongly classified as clean commits (respectively changed files); we refer to them as to
false negatives. In this research question, we want to understand the reasons behind these
false positives and negatives. The answer of this question may help us to discover further
hidden factors that are related to unintentional protection impacting changes and to improve
our current predictive models.
Approach. We performed a qualitative analysis of false positives and false negatives to
search for the main causes of the wrong classification of the predictive model. In WordPress,
using Random Forest, 509 commits were false negatives, and 239 commits were false positives.
In MediaWiki, We obtained 580 false negative commits and 110 false positives commits with
Random Forest (our best performing classifier).
To understand the characteristics of the misclassified commits, we randomly took a sample
of them with a margin error of 10% and a confidence level of 95%.
For WordPress, our sample was of 83 / 509 false negatives and 69 / 239 false positives.
Findings. We summarize our observations in Table 5.4. Overall, we observed that many
wrongly classified commits changed a version field (for WordPress, in version.php and
in DefaultSettings.php for MediaWiki). If we leave out changes to version fields, some
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commits had only documentation changes. Some other commits featured changes in the
embedded HTML, JavaScript or CSS code. While these changes were within a .php file,
they are not PHP code per se. Changes to non-PHP code or to documentation cannot be
protection-impacting by definition. We also observed that a minority of wrongly classified
commits added control flow branches (conditions or loops), which may in turn have affected
some of the observed metrics. Some commits were merge commits due to their strategy of
continuous integration development, others were the addition of profiling information, and a
few were clearly related to the RBAC implementation. There is 18 / 19 in WordPress and
19 in MediaWiki that were only about documentation or contained whitespaces only; these
commits are clearly non-PIC but were predicted as PIC.
Table 5.4 Qualitative Observations Over Wrongly Classified Commits
Observation WordPress MediaWiki
Samples FP (69 / 239) FN (83 / 509) FP (52 / 109) FN (84 / 579)
Modified a version field 23 13 1 0
Documentation or
whitespace only 1 18 0 19
Changes to embedded
HTML/JS/CSS 4 6 0 0
Branches added or deleted 13 20 8 17
Similar in/out 50 44 31 33
Merge commits 0 0 6 4
Profiling 0 0 2 0
RBAC-Related 0 0 2 0
These observations lead us to methodological improvements to consider in future research.



First, per-project rules defining code changes to ignore should be added. For instance, all
changes to version.php in WordPress should be ignored. Future research in repository
mining for PICs should ignore documentation-only commits altogether, and possibly strip
comments from the code changes analyzed. In addition, a per-project whitelist of internal
APIs known to have no impact on privilege protection (e.g. profiling calls) could be used
to filter out changes further.
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CHAPTER 6 THREATS TO VALIDITY
We now discuss in this chapter the threats to the validity of our study following the guidelines
for case study research (Yin, 2002).
6.1 Threats to internal validity
Threats to internal validity are factors that may influence our independent variables and that
were not taken into account. Our results depend on the accuracy of the PTFA engine that
we used. This engine relies on sound but conservative approximations for dynamic features
common to PHP applications. These approximations may lead to spurious paths and thus
spurious protection-impacting changes. The reported spurious path rate for PTFA is 10.96
± 3.18% (95% confidence level) (Laverdière et Merlo, 2017).
Our results also depend on the source differencing tools we used. We used GNU diff to
extract line-level differences between releases. This causes some imprecision in the vertex
mapping between releases, and some vertices may be inaccurately considered changed. How-
ever, this should not affect much our results, since the output of the security-impacting
change detection tool, and the rest of the analysis is also at the line granularity. To validate
the detected protection-impacting changes, we randomly sampled 100 commits that are con-
sidered as PICs. We analyzed the corresponding changed lines in these commits and observed
that many commits are exact protection-impacting changes, which provides us confidence on
the accuracy of our detection results.
6.2 Threats to conclusion validity
Threats to conclusion validity are concerned with the relationship between the treatments and
the outcome. We paid attention to not violate the assumptions when performing statistical
analyses. In RQ2, we only used non-parametric tests (including Mann-Whitney U test and
Cliff’s Delta effect size) that do not require making assumptions on the distribution of our
dataset. To mitigate the familywise error rate in our null hypotheses, we used the Bonferroni
correction to calculate an adjusted p-value for each subject characteristic. When building
statistical models, we applied variance inflation factor (VIF) to remove multicollinearity
among the independent variables.
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6.3 Threats to external validity
Threats to external validity affect the generalizability of our results. Despite the fact that
our approach may leverage vulnerability oracle, we did not have access to one for our study.
Consequently, we cannot study protection-impacting changes specifically for vulnerabilities
and tune a model specifically for them. To counter this issue, studies using a vulnerability
oracle (e.g. a testbench with known vulnerabilities) should be performed.
Another threat to generalizability is that our study is conducted on two open source content
management systems implemented in PHP WordPress and MediaWiki. We may obtain
different results when studying other systems. We may also obtain different results for
systems in other languages. Our approach itself is reproducible and language-independent,
although the PTFA engine we used only handles PHP at the moment. Consequently, our
conclusions depend on the change history of this single system. To counter this issue, studies
that include other systems, and systems in other languages, should be performed.
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION
This chapter concludes our work and outlines some avenues for future works.
7.1 Summary of the Results
In this thesis, in order to enable just-in-time identification of commits that cause privilege
protection changes, we conducted an analysis of protection-impacting changes across 211
release pairs of WordPress and 193 release pairs of MediaWiki. We observed that around 60%
of commits submitted in the code repositories of these systems affected privileges protections.
To help developers identify these changes early on before they are integrated in the code, we
extracted a series of metrics from commit logs and source code, and built statistical models.
The evaluation of these models showed that they can achieve a precision up to 73.8% and a
recall up to 87.6% in WordPress and for MediaWiki, a precision up to 77.2% and recall up to
96%. Among the metrics that we examined; commit churn, bug fixing, author experiences and
code complexity between two releases were the most important predictors in the models. A
qualitative analysis of the false positives and false negatives of the models revealed that they
are mostly due to documentation-only commits. A minority of wrongly classified commits
added control flow branches (conditions or loops), which may in turn have affected some of
the observed metrics.
Our approach does not replace security reviews nor does it remove the need to use a PTFA-
based protection-impacting change detector. However, it may complement these approaches
in a synergic manner and greatly reduce the number of code changes that need to be reviewed
for protection impacts at a later stage of the software development process.
7.2 Future Work
In future work, we would like to expand our study to more systems, written in both PHP and
other languages. We also plan to conduct usability studies with professional developers to
further assess the usefulness of our proposed method. We would like to quantify the savings
in terms of review effort.
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Figure A.1 Distribution of different metrics specifying the characteristics of PICs and non-
PICs commits in WordPress.
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Figure A.2 Distribution of different metrics specifying the characteristics of PICs and non-
PICs commits in MediaWiki.
